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In his important 2013 book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson claims
that “there is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the possibilism-actualism
[P-A] distinction” and, indeed, that usage of the terms ‘possibilism’ and ‘actual-
ism’ “has become badly confused”. The claim is surprising, as the P-A distinc-
tion is widely discussed in the philosophical literature and, while there is substan-
tial metaphysical disagreement to be found, there is in fact very little evidence of
any deep confusions over exactly what the disagreement concerns. The reason for
that, I will argue, is that the distinction is entirely coherent and that Williamson’s
charges are mostly unwarranted.
Specifically, in §1 of this paper I discuss some of the historical antecedents of
what I call the modern subsistence conception of the P-A distinction, which I refine
in §2. I then turn to Williamson’s attack on the P-A distinction in §3 and examine
in particular two arguments that he sketches that purport to show that problems
will arise for any proposed definition of the distinction; I find both arguments
wanting. In §4 I discuss Williamson’s preferred distinction between necessitism
and contingentism and argue that, broadened so as to enable necessitists to fend
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off contingentist objections, the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction can
be faithfully reconstructed within Williamson’s own framework and, hence, that it
is, at least, no more confused or unsatisfying than the necessitism-contingentism
distinction. However, Williamson’s critique does point to a genuine shortcoming
in the subsistence conception as commonly formulated. In §5 I propose an alterna-
tive definition of the P-A distinction in terms of essential properties that I believe
avoids this shortcoming.
1 Historical Underpinnings of the Subsistence Con-
ception
The heart of the P-A distinction that, I claim, is at stake in Williamson’s attack
turns in the first instance on the question of whether or not being is bifurcated,
that is, whether or not what there is, in the broadest sense, divides non-trivially
into two jointly exhaustive, mutually disjoint ontological categories: things that
exist, or are actual, and things that merely subsist. Roughly and incompletely put
for now, existence includes at least everything that is within the causal order, and
subsistence includes, if not all, at least only things that are not within the causal
order. A merely possible object — possibile, for short — is thus a subsistent object
that could have existed and possibilism the view that there at least could be possi-
bilia. I will call this the subsistence conception of possibilia/possibilism and I will
argue that it is the basis of the P-A distinction.1
Part of my defense of the P-A distinction is that the subsistence conception of
possibilia has a lengthy historical pedigree. The bifurcation of being, in particular,
can be traced back at least to the Stoics, who introduced a highest genus above
existence encompassing both concrete existents as well as “incorporeals” that fail
to exist but, rather, “have a derivative kind of reality the Stoics term subsistence
(ὑpiόσvτασvις)” (de Harven 2015, p. 406)2:
The Stoics want to place above this [the existent] yet another, more pri-
mary genus. ... Some Stoics consider ‘something’ the first genus, and I
1There is, of course, a well-known alternative to this conception of possibilia, viz., David Lewis’s
(1986). Following Williamson (ibid., p. 22), I do not consider Lewis’s reductionist account to be
relevant to the modalist version of the debate under discussion here.
2See also Caston 1999. My thanks to Professor Caston for pointing me to the Seneca quote here.
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shall add the reason why they do. In nature, they say, some things exist,
some do not exist. But nature includes even those which do not exist
— things which enter the mind, such as Centaurs, giants, and whatever
else falsely formed by thought takes on some image despite lacking
substance. (Seneca, Letters 58:13-15, quoted in Long and Sedley 1987,
p. 162.)
Here, and in many subsequent discussions, bifurcation is motivated not by explic-
itly modal considerations but by intentional considerations, our ability to conceive
of things that fail to exist, an ability that seems to require that there be something
to serve as the “proper subject of thought and discourse” (Long and Sedley 1987,
p. 164). A notable adumbration of the P-A distinction proper motivated not by
intentionality but by theological considerations is seen in the distinction between
thing (shay′) and existent (mawju¯d) in early Islamic philosophy. The distinction
arose out of exegetical struggles with two passages of the Qur’an (16:40, 36:82)
suggesting that creation consists in God saying “Be!” to a thing, causing it thereby
to exist, to become an existent (Wisnovski 2003, p. 147). The apparent implication
here — embraced explicitly by the Mutazilite theologians in the 9th and 10th Cen-
turies — was that, because things are commanded to exist, they must in some sense
have been prior to God’s creative commands and, hence, that shay′ encompassed
not only existents but non-existents as well — specifically, those that have ceased
to exist but were called into existence, those that will be called into existence, and
those that only could be, but never in fact are, called into existence (op. cit., pp. 145-
8). Non-existents of this third sort, of course, clearly foreshadow possibilia in our
sense.
In much subsequent discussion in the late medieval period, the question of pos-
sibilia was framed in terms of a Euthyphro-style grounding dilemma, i.e., whether
(a) things are possible because God has the power to make them or (b) whether
God has the power to make them because they are possible (see M. Adams 1987,
p. 1065). The influential Islamic philosopher Avicenna, who was strongly influ-
enced by the antecedent theological debates over shay’ and mawju¯d, appeared to
grasp horn (b) of the dilemma, arguing explicitly for something very much like the
subsistence conception of possibilia:
It is necessary with respect to everything that came into existence that
before it came into existence, it was in itself possibly existent. For if
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it had not been possibly existent in itself, it never would exist at all.
Moreover, the possibility of its existence does not consist in the fact that
an agent could produce it or that an agent has power over it. Indeed,
an agent would scarcely have power over it, if the thing itself were not
possible in itself.3
Subsequent Catholic philosophers, following Augustine (1982, pp. 79-81), opted
to ground possibilia and other non-concrete entities ontologically in the divine
mind, by either identifying them with divine intellective acts or with the “objective
contents”, or products, of such acts.4 Most medieval thinkers, in turn, grounded
their possibility — that is, the possibility of their exemplification — in God’s power
to actualize them5, thereby grasping the other horn of the grounding dilemma.
Particularly important for our purposes, however, is that the idea of bifurcation is
still prominent: mere presence in the divine intellect confers on possibilia (so un-
derstood) a sort of lesser or “diminished” being (esse diminuta). Thus Peter Auriol,
as quoted by Ockham (M. Adams op. cit., p. 79):
An act of intellect is very similar to the thing it is about. Therefore,
through this likeness ... the thing seizes a certain existence through the
act of understanding insofar as [that act] is very similar to the thing,
so that understood existence is not a mere denomination, but a certain
diminished intentional or apparent existence ... .
And although Auriol here speaks of objects of thought generally, Henry of Ghent,
Duns Scotus, and William Ockham (in his earlier writings, at least) all emphasized
that this less robust mode of being includes possibilia alongside fictional objects,
impossible objects, and logical objects.6
In more recent times, Meinong is well-known for postulating an ontology of
nonexistent objects (Gegenstände) to ground his general theory of meaning, cog-
nition, and intentionality.7 In his work, however, we find both more, and more
3Quoted in M. Adams 1987, p. 1068. See also McGinnis 2010, pp. 162-3 and See also Wolter
2003b.
4Cf. De Rijk 2005, pp. 33-37, 77-78, and M. Adams 1987, pp. 79-83.
5See M. Adams, op. cit., chs. 24 and 25, Wolter 2003a, and De Rijk 2005, pp. 79-95.
6Cf., respectively, De Rijk, op. cit., p. 81, Wolter 2003b, pp. 137-8, and M. Adams 1977, p. 147.
7Meinong 1960 is the locus classicus of his account. See Marek 2013 for an illuminating and
accessible exposition.
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fine-grained, metaphysical divisions than existence and subsistence and, more-
over, a rather startlingly different understanding of what sorts of objects belong
where among these divisions. In order to explain our ability to speak and think
meaningfully about the likes of Homeric gods, golden mountains, and the round
square — if only to deny their existence — Meinong famously adopted, or at least
presupposed, a semantic principle to the effect that every definite or (in inten-
tional contexts, at least) indefinite description denotes an object that exemplifies
the properties expressed in the description, that is (perhaps a bit anachronistically
put), the principle:
MSP For (perhaps quite complex) adjectives α and common noun phrases N ,
pthe/a(n) αNq denotes an object that is both α and an N.8
Thus, “the golden mountain” denotes an object that is both golden and a mountain;
likewise, “the round square” denotes an object that is both round and a square.
However, notwithstanding this semantic principle, according to Meinong there are
not, in any sense, any Homeric gods or round squares. Hence, he divided the class
of objects into two subclasses: those that have being, {x : B!x}, and those that lack
it, {x : ¬B!x}. The former included both existing (existierende, reale, or wirkliche)
objects — concrete objects that are part of the causal order and hence in space
and time — and “ideal” (ideale) objects like numbers, properties, and propositions
(Objektive) that “do intdeed subsist (bestehen), but which do not by any means
exist (existieren)” (op. cit., p. 79), as they are by nature outside of the causal order
and, hence, outside of space and time. The latter — those objects lacking being
altogether — include in particular the class of “incomplete” objects {x : ∃F(¬Fx∧
¬Fx)}, i.e., those objects that, for at least one property F, have neither F nor its
complement F. This class includes fictional objects like the Homeric gods but also,
notably, objects like the golden mountain and the round square that are denoted
by simple definite descriptions.9
8Meinong’s actual account is rather more subtle than this, although I think MSP is faithful
enough for purposes here. See Parsons (1974) (pp. 573ff) formal reconstruction of Meinong’s se-
mantics and Simons 1992 ch. 7 (esp. §2.1 and §3) more detailed philosophical account.
9Obviously, lest such objects lead directly to contradiction, in a Meinongian object theory (ex-
pressed in classical logic), Fx will not follow from ¬Fx; equivalently, Fx will not follow from ¬Fx,
i.e., failing to have F will not entail having its complement F. This is a familiar sort of restriction
for avoiding Russell-style paradoxes in logics with property-denoting expressions. See, e.g., Turner
1987 and Menzel 1993.
5
Now, possibilia in any sense resembling the subsistence conception do not ap-
pear to be among any of Meinong’s objects.10 Thus, Meinong’s division of being
into existing and subsisting objects — objects within and without space and time,
respectively — seems to be little more than the traditional distinction between ma-
terial, concrete objects and abstract, platonic objects. It was Russell, in his early
career, who broadened the subsistent realm beyond the abstract to include some
of Meinong’s Nichtseiende and who, thereby, at least made room for possibilia.
Meinong’s influence on Russell was profound but, even in his most ontolog-
ically profligate years shortly after the turn of the century, Russell was repelled
by the idea of objects that do not so much as subsist, let alone those like the
round square whose nature is logically contradictory.11 He did, however, still find
Meinong’s semantic/cognitive arguments in the main convincing and, hence, con-
tinued (until around 1905, at least12) to embrace a restricted version of MSP and,
as a consequence, at least some of the objects found among Meinong’s Nichtseiende,
fictional objects in particular. In order to embrace such objects without commit-
ting to Nichtseiende as such, Russell simply retained Meinong’s bifurcation of be-
ing and squeezed fictional objects and their ilk into the realm of subsistent objects
— objects that have being but do not exist within the causal order (Russell 1903,
p. 449):
Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional
spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could
make no propositions about them. Thus being is a general attribute of
everything, and to mention anything is to show that it is. ... Existence,
on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. ...
10This isn’t to say Meinong was skeptical of modality. But he never really appeals to his ontology
to ground, or explain, such modal facts as our possible nonexistence or the possibility that there
could have been more, or other, things. See Peter Simons’ (2013) detailed account of the elaborate
theory of modality in Meinong’s huge 1915 treatise. Meinong also seems to suggest at one point
that objects that are not in fact part of the causal order but could be are also real (Meinong 1899,
p. 198). Unfortunately, he does not seem to have elaborated on this suggestion.
11See Chisholm 1973 for an attempt to render Meinong’s Nichtseiende coherent. In fact, though,
according to Meinong, all objects as such — even existing objects (hence more generally those that
have being B!) — qua pure objects, are ausserseiend, or “beyond being and non-being”. See Meinong
1960, §4, esp. p. 86, and Marek op. cit., §4. This is Meinong’s “principle of the indifference of pure
objects to being” (ibid.).
12Once he had formulated his theory of descriptions, of course, Russell (1905) denied that def-
inite and indefinite descriptions, as well as ordinary proper names like ‘Pegasus’, were genuine
denoting expressions.
6
[T]his distinction is essential, if we are ever to deny the existence of
anything. For what does not exist must be something, or it would be
meaningless to deny its existence; and hence we need the concept of
being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent.
Now, similar to Meinong, Russell also did not explicitly make a place for possi-
bilia in our sense in his ontology, although in his case this had less to do with the
finer theoretical details of an elaborate ontology than with his skepticism about
modality generally.13 Accordingly, he did not ever provide any examples of sub-
sistent entities whose descriptions were explicitly modal. Importantly, though, his
arguments above apply just as well when, say, we deny the existence of the possi-
ble person who would have developed from the union of this sperm and that egg or the
possible knife consisting of this blade and that handle. Thus, his skepticism of modal-
ity notwithstanding, there seems little doubt that the subsistent — understood
generally to comprise things outside of space and time — is the natural home of
possibilia in the early Russell’s bifurcated ontology.
In his famous 1948 essay “On What There Is”, Quine makes the inclusion of
possibilia among the subsistent explicit via the voice of his ontologically promiscu-
ous fictional philosopher Wyman (p. 22):
Pegasus, Wyman maintains, has his being as an unactualized possible.
When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more
precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality.
Saying that Pegasus is not actual is on a par, logically, with saying that
the Parthenon is not red; in either case we are saying something about
an entity whose being is unquestioned. ... Existence is one thing, he
says, and subsistence is another.
Unfortunately, although he gets this critical element of the modern conception
right, Quine’s account still suffers from a fundamental confusion lurking in the
Meinongian semantic principle MSP. The confusion in question is revealed in the
well-known rhetorical questions Quine raised concerning identity conditions for
possibilia (pp. 23-4):
13See Meinong 1965, p. 152 for a particularly striking example.
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Take, for instance, the [merely] possible fat man in that doorway; and,
again, the [merely] possible bald man in that doorway.14 Are they the
same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How
many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible
thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their
being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this
the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or,
finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized
possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which
cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and dis-
tinct from one another?
Quine’s questions were clearly intended to serve as a reductio of possibilism.
Whether they do is much less clear. The questions obviously assume at least some
variant of MSP from which it follows in particular that the merely possible fat man
in the doorway is possible (i.e., a possibile), a man, and in the doorway; likewise,
the possible bald man in the doorway. Hence, both of the possible men in question
are in the doorway. Quine’s subsequent questions — whether we have one or two
of them and, in either case, in virtue of what is it the case, and so on — are thus
entirely natural ones. Far from yielding the desired reductio, however, Quine’s
questions can, at the least, equally be taken to reflect shortcomings in MSP and
in Quine’s resulting conception of possibilia — shortcomings that he likely would
have avoided if only had he been aware of Bolzano’s trenchant (and, at the time,
over a century-old) analysis of modal descriptions and his sophisticated modal
metaphysics.
Bolzano appears (again, somewhat anachronistically put) to have accepted a
qualified form of MSP insofar as he thought that a noun phrase of (in particular)
the form “merely possible F” expresses an idea (Vorstellung) that is “objectual”
(gegenständlich), i.e., that has something falling under it, and hence that “a/the
merely possible F” denotes, so long as it is not logically or metaphysically incoher-
ent.15 Bolzano is clear, however, that the objects of such ideas are not the incom-
14I add the qualification “merely” here simply because Quine clearly intended to be discussing
possibilia whereas, since actual individuals are possible, if by chance there happened to be an ac-
tual bald or portly man in the doorway, the expressions in question would (contrary to Quine’s
intentions) pick him out rather than any (alleged) possibilia.
15See Bolzano 1837a, §352, p. 406 and its translation in Schnieder 2007, p. 541.
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plete objects of Meinong’s realm of non-being but, rather, are fully determinate
objects in a fully-fledged realm of being that includes both traditional abstract
objects and possibilia:
[A]part from those things which have actuality (Wirchlichkeit) ..., there
are also others which have mere possibility (bloße Möglichkeit), as well
as those which can never make the transition to actuality, e.g., propo-
sitions and truths as such (Bolzano 1837b, §483, pp. 184–85; trans. in
Schnieder 2007, p. 529).
Not only actual objects ... but even merely possible objects as well as
objects that can never become actual — in brief, all objects without
exception are completely determinate (Bolzano 2014, §45, p. 209).
Bolzano thus firmly embraced a bifurcated conception of being comprising both
objects within the causal order — those with actuality — and objects outside of
it, where the latter comprise both traditional abstracta and fully determinate pos-
sibilia, objects that only contingently fail to be actual.
Although Bolzano’s conception of possibilia is much clearer and more explicit
on the matters of determinacy and ontological status, thus far it does not differ ap-
preciably from that of Quine’s Wyman. Critically, though, as Schnieder (2007) con-
vincingly shows, Bolzano argued that, contrary to Quine’s understanding of MSP,
the usual function of “possible” in a common noun phrase of the form ppossible
αNq is not to add a further property — possibility — to the properties that α pred-
icates of an N . Indeed, while pthe/a possible αNq certainly picks out an object
o for Bolzano (so long as pαNq is logically coherent), the qualification ‘possible’
cancels the implication that o is either α or an N . Hence, in particular, even if we
agree that “the possible fat man in the doorway” and “the possible bald man in
the doorway” denote objects, it follows only that those objects could be portly/bald
men in the given doorway; nothing follows about what or where they in fact are —
indeed, if they denote genuine possibilia and hence have no spatio-temporal loca-
tion, they are most certainly not men and not in the doorway. On this understand-
ing of modal descriptions, then, Quine’s questions all either have straightforward
answers — e.g., there are no possible portly/bald men in that empty doorway — or
are no harder to answer than parallel questions that might arise in any other case
where we are unacquainted with the referents of two descriptions.
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It is unfortunate that Bolzano’s robust conception of fully determinate, subsis-
tent possibilia went largely unnoticed — had it not, it seems likely that the subse-
quent history would have involved far less confusion over the nature of the possi-
ble and considerably less skepticism about de re modality in general. Fortunately,
underwritten by modern possible world semantics, what is essentially Bolzano’s
conception sprang out of the ashes of Quine’s skepticism and is found (though not
necessarily endorsed) in a wide swath of the modern literature on modal meta-
physics — see, e.g., Plantinga 1976, Kaplan 1975, R. Adams 1981, Zalta 1983,
Fitch 1996, Fine 2005, and Parfit 2011 (notably, Appendix J).
2 The Modern P-A Distinction
The subsistence conception of possibilia, then — basically as found in Bolzano’s
largely neglected account — serves as the basis for the subsistence conception of
the P-A distinction itself. To reiterate: possibilism on this conception is the view
that being — everything there is in the broadest, most unrestricted sense — is
bifurcated into two categories: subsistence and existence, a.k.a. actuality. Sub-
sistence includes (at least) the possibilia — fully determinate (albeit non-spatio-
temporal) objects that contingently fail to exist, objects that could have existed but
do not, in fact, exist.
Formally, then, and a bit more generally, using the predicate E! for existence/
actuality, possibilism on the subsistence conception is simply the view that there
at least could be possibilia:
Poss ^∃x(¬E!x∧^E!x)
Actualism, then, on the subsistence conception, is simply possibilism’s denial:
there are no possibilia, nor could there have been; necessarily, everything (in the
broadest sense) that could exist, already does.
Act ∀x(^E!x→ E!x)
Call this the basic subsistence conception of the P-A distinction (the basic P-A dis-
tinction, for short) and Poss and Act basic possibilism and basic actualism, respec-
tively.
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Figure 1: The “Bolzanian” P-A Distinction
Abstracta and Actuality. The basic P-A distinction is so-called because it divides
the world into two broad categories but it is silent on finer ontological subdivi-
sions that might be required by such things as God and abstracta. As seen above,
Bolzano categorized abstracta alongside possibilia as subsistent things outside the
causal order, the difference being that, unlike possibilia, they subsist necessarily;
they “can never make the transition to actuality”. And while Bolzano (1837 §79,
p. 364) apparently did not consider God to occupy space and time, he nonethe-
less considered God, as creator, to be part of the causal order (Bolzano 1973 §175,
p. 259) and hence to be actual, albeit, again, necessarily so. Making these aspects
of Bolzano’s modal ontology explicit yields what we can call the “Bolzanian” P-A
distinction, depicted in Figure 1.
However, there are good reasons to depart from Bolzano and follow Quine in
the classification of abstracta. Specifically, Quine (speaking in his own voice con-
tra Wyman) breaks the connection between subsistence and causal inertness/non-
spatio-temporality and grants existence proper to mathematical objects (1948, p. 23):
If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only be-
cause the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not be-
cause ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal ref-
erence is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27,
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this is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing,
and not because we are being ambiguous in our use of ‘exist’.
Generalizing Quine’s conception to all abstracta, then, subsistence is exactly the
domain of the merely possible. And note this classification arguably comports bet-
ter with the idea first hinted at by the Mutazilites that existence is a more robust
way of being. There is perhaps a temptation to identify robustness with spatio-
temporality but, as Bolzano already noted, that would classify God as merely sub-
sistent. A more plausible basis for the distinction that would keep God among
the actual but abstracta among the subsistent is participation in the causal order,
but that raises fraught questions concerning, notably, the nature of causation and
the status of some mental entities. Better, I think, to take the robustness in ques-
tion to be a feature of things that are “fully realized” — consider in particular the
difference between a purported merely possible person x subsisting as a mere pos-
sibile, dwelling with no (non-modal) distinguishing characteristics in logical space,
and that same object x after coming to exist as a fully realized human being. By
contrast, abstracta are already, so to say, all they can be; unlike possibilia, their
“potential” is fully realized, their non-spatio-temporality notwithstanding.
Classifying abstracta as actual also accords far better with the intuitive under-
standing of actualism. For, if abstracta only subsist, as on the Bolzanian concep-
tion, then it remains the case under actualism that there are still things that do not
exist. But actualism’s guiding intuition is that there is no bifurcation in being —
to be is to exist is to be actual. Classifying abstracta among existing things enables
the actualist to preserve this unified picture.
We can force this classification explicitly by means of a principle that rules out
the possibility of necessarily subsistent things altogether, viz.,
^E! ∀x^E!x.
In addition to classifying abstracta as existent, the principle also has the salutary
effect (for the actualist, anyway) of ruling out impossibilia — round squares and
the like that can’t possibly exist due to some sort of internal logical inconsistency.
Given ^E!, Act is rendered equivalent to what is arguably the most familiar for-
mulation of actualism, viz., that, necessarily, everything is actual,16
16See R. Adams 1981 (p. 7), Menzel 2014 (Introduction), Parfit 2011 (p. 719), and Plantinga 1976
(p. 143), among others.
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Act∗ ∀xE!x;
likewise its possibilist correlate
Poss∗ ^∃x¬E!x.
This historically grounded conception of the P-A distinction is depicted in Fig-
ure 2. Call it the modern (subsistence conception of the) P-A distinction and, ac-
cordingly, call its component theses modern possibilism and modern actualism.17
The modern P-A distinction, I believe, is the focus of Williamson’s arguments.
(Henceforth I will typically drop the adjective “modern”.)
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Figure 2: The Modern P-A Distinction
3 Williamson’s Attack on the P-A Distinction
As noted, Williamson claims that “[t]here is a widespread feeling of dissatisfac-
tion with the possibilism-actualism distinction.” As far as I can see, however,
Williamson evinces precious little support from the relevant literature for this
17The picture might be somewhat more complicated for modern actualists and modern pos-
sibilists alike whose ontology includes “impure” abstracta like the set {∅,Obama} and so-called
“singular” propositions like Obama was born in Hawaii that contain, or “involve”, contingent indi-
viduals. Though fascinating, the issues are largely orthogonal to those under discussion here.
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claim.18 Be that as it may, he does provide some arguments that purport to provide
reasons for the alleged dissatisfaction.
On Williamson’s telling, “[t]he actualist holds that everything is actual, while
the possibilist holds that not everything is actual, although everything is possible”
(2013, p. 22). So, formally, we have
PossW ∃x¬E!x∧∀x^E!x,
and actualism is simply the denial of the first conjunct: there are no possibilia;
everything (in the broadest sense) exists:
ActW ∀xE!x.
Williamson’s portrayal misses some of the modal character of Poss and Act, but
PossW entails Poss (and an unnecessitated version of ^E!) and, presumably, he
would allow that ActW is a necessary truth. So Williamson’s portrayal is largely in
agreement with the modern subsistence conception.
Williamson’s first attack on the P-A distinction proceeds by way of the question
(p. 22), “what is it for something to be actual, or to be possible?” After (rightly,
in my view) rejecting Lewis’s (1986) answer,19 Williamson tries again: “On a less
loaded account [than Lewis’s], what is actual is simply what there actually (un-
restrictedly) is. . . . Analogously, what is possible is what there could be (unre-
strictedly)” and so, presumably, what is merely possible is what there could be but
actually is not. That is, Williamson is suggesting that uses of the verb phrase “is ac-
tual” be spelled out in terms of quantification, identity, and the adverb “actually”,
expressed formally by the semantically well-understood modal operator “@” (see,
e.g., Hazen 1976; H. Hodes 1984, 1984; Stephanou 2005). On this account, then,
actualism is the thesis that everything is actually identical to something, i.e.,
18See note 22.
19In a nutshell, Williamson rejects Lewis’s modal reductionism that interprets the modal op-
erators as quantifiers over Lewisian worlds, i.e., maximally inclusive, mutually non-overlapping
spatio-temporal regions (Lewis 1986, p. 2; Menzel 2016, §2.1.1). On such a conception, Williamson
writes (ibid.), “we cannot explain what is at stake in the actualism–possibilism debate”. This can
be spelled out in terms of the subsistence conception. For Lewis, there is no bifurcation of be-
ing: the denizens of other worlds exist in a manner no different from those in our world (cf. ibid.,
pp. 2-3); they are simply not here, in the broadest possible sense of ‘here’. Hence, the existence
predicate E! — under its intended meaning on the subsistence conception, i.e., the more robust of
two modes of being — in Lewis’s framework is simply true of everything in every world, i.e., we
have ∀x(E!x ↔ ∃y y = x). Lewis’s modal reductionism thus renders Poss trivially false and Act
trivially true. Hence, Lewis’s reductionist framework begs the question in favor of actualism and
so “we cannot explain what is at stake” in the P-A debate.
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Act@ ∀x@∃y y = x,
and possibilism is the thesis that there are things such that while, actually, or in
fact, there is nothing identical to them, there nonetheless could be, i.e.,
Poss@ ∃x(¬@∃y y = x∧^∃y y = x).
However, as Williamson (p. 23) notes, “on standard accounts of the logic of ‘actu-
ally’, it is a modal operator whose insertion makes a difference to truth value only
when in the scope of another modal operator such as ‘possibly’ or ‘necessarily’,”
a consequence of which is that Act@ is equivalent to the logical truth ∀x∃y y = x
and Poss@ entails its negation. Hence, on the suggested analysis, Act@ is logically
trivial and Poss@ logically false. Clearly, then, the “is actual” predicate cannot be
analyzed in terms of the “actually” operator. But it is equally clear why this exer-
cise goes wrong: the two have entirely different logical functions. In the context
of the P-A debate, the function of the predicate is to express a purported property
that, according to the possibilist, necessarily, only some things have.20 By contrast,
the function of the operator is to force the sentence it qualifies to be evaluated with
respect to the world that happens to be actual — a contingent fact utterly irrele-
vant to the function of the “is actual” predicate. It is therefore no surprise that
neither is analyzable in terms of the other.
For Williamson, the failure of the analysis of the P-A distinction in terms of the
‘actually’ operator simply points to the fact that the distinction is fundamentally
wrong-headed, indeed “hopelessly muddled” (pp 23-4). His grounds for this as-
sertion, beyond the analytic failure just noted, appear to rest on two arguments.
The first (p. 23):
On the supposed alternative [to the operator account] ..., being actual
had better be actually doing something harder than just being, other-
wise the supposed dispute is silly. But what is that harder thing, if a
dispute about whether everything does it is as fundamental to modal
metaphysics as the dispute between actualism and possibilism is sup-
posed to be?
20Under reasonable assumptions there are (in a possibilist ontology) incompossibles — pairs of
objects that can’t be jointly actual. Hence, necessarily, not all possible objects are actual.
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It’s not entirely clear how the argument goes here. Obviously, the actualist cannot
sensibly claim that, necessarily, everything does some harder thing — being actual,
presumably — when, according to modern actualism Act∗, necessarily, nothing
fails to do it. But that very fact seems to be the purported worry here. So un-
derstood, the argument seems to be, the existence/actuality predicate is otiose; the
actualist could just as well define the predicate in terms of the existential quantifier
thus:
∃E! E!x =df ∃y y = x,
thereby rendering actualism logically trivial, as Act∗+∃E! yields the simple logical
truth
Act∗∃E! ∀x∃y y = x.
How then can actualism possibly be considered a substantive philosophical claim?
However, this characterization of things is misleading. For actualism is not put
forward in a philosophical vacuum as an independent thesis; it is defined solely in
contrast to possibilism. Actualism’s bite lies in what it denies, not in what it asserts.
Actualism is the denial of possibilism’s purported ontological bifurcation; it is the
possibilist who casts being actual as the “harder” of two things, i.e., as the more
robust of two fundamental ontological states. Actualism is simply the denial of
the bifurcation, the denial that “is actual” signifies a “harder” thing. It is no knock
against the actualists that their account renders being actual logically trivial; that
is exactly how it should be if it is not after all the harder of two things, just as the
actualist claims.21
Williamson’s second salvo (ibid):
21Bennett (2005, pp. 298-9) also expresses a concern about the logical triviality of the “actualist
slogan” Everything is actual. As she does not formalize the slogan, I found her precise concern
difficult to pin down. However, the source of its alleged triviality is that, if the range of its quantifier
is understood (in terms of Kripke semantics) to be world-relative (as I would say it is, albeit in a
sense acceptable to actualists — see Menzel 1990), “its truth is just the straightforward result of the
way that the quantifier interacts with the ‘actually’ operator”. So, whatever exactly Bennett has in
mind, the problem in question is similar to the one Williamson noted above when he attempted to
render the slogan in terms of the “actually” operator. Hence, she is simply not addressing modern
actualism Act∗; and as noted in the current paragraph, formalizing the slogan with an “is actual”
predicate and understanding (the necessitation of) the slogan as a response to possibilism is critical
to addressing concerns over logical triviality.
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And why should the alternative to the view that everything actually
does the harder thing be a view on which everything could do the
harder thing? Why cannot something be impossible, in the sense that
it could not do the harder thing?
Here, however, Williamson is attacking a straw man, as the denial of impossibilia
— things that necessarily fail to be actual — is an artifact of his own definition
of actualism ActW . As noted in §2 above, impossibilia are entirely consistent with
basic actualism Act, ∀x(^E!x → E!x); they are only ruled out explicitly by the
additional principle ^E! that was invoked to force abstracta into the actual but
which has the side effect of ruling out more aggressively nonexistent objects like
the round square. Since, as Williamson rightly suggests, the question of impossi-
bilia is not philosophically trivial, it is a virtue of the subsistence conception that
they are not in fact ruled out by definition.
So Williamson’s attacks on the P-A distinction — when understood in accor-
dance with the subsistence conception — don’t amount to much; he has not shown
that the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction is problematic, let alone
“hopelessly muddled”.22 However, he does introduce a distinction of his own that
he argues is far clearer and more useful than the P-A distinction. Let us see if that
might be so.
22In chapter 7 of his book, Williamson casts further aspersions on the P-A distinction, claiming
that “obscure disputes” over “systematic mappings from the talk of one side to the talk of the other
[have] figured in [the debates between possibilists and actualists] significantly” (2013, p. 305).
However, the disputes in question are small in number and, by my lights, play no significant role
in the P-A debate as I have (fairly, I hope) portrayed it. Specifically, these discussions frame the P-A
distinction in terms of translation schemes between so-called possibilist and actualist languages
— a framing chiefly due to Fine (1977, 1985) and, to a lesser degree, Pollock (1985). (Williamson
also cites Melia (1992) and Forbes (1992) in this regard, but their debate solely concerns the ex-
pressive adequacy of a modalist language that Forbes proposes; neither philosopher characterizes
it as the P-A debate.) As Williamson notes, such a framing threatens to reduce the P-A debate to
a mere “verbal disagreement”. But if my characterization above is correct, that is simply not the
proper framing. The P-A debate has nothing whatever to do with “systematic mappings” between
distinct possibilist and actualist languages. To the contrary, possibilists and actualists share a basic
quantified modal language that (thanks to the possibilist) includes an existence/actuality predicate
E! (though of course each might extend this basic language in different ways) and their very real
disagreement concerns the truth values of certain specific sentences in that language, notably, Poss
and Act. For possibilist and actualist alike, the quantifiers of this common language necessarily
range over everything there is, in the broadest sense. Where they differ, crucially, is over the onto-
logical question of whether the range of those quantifiers could include possibilia, things that fail
to be actual, and, hence, whether the existence predicate E! could be true of fewer things than are
in the range of the quantifiers. (This is roughly Plantinga’s take in his cogent 1985 replies to Fine
(pp. 329-49) and Pollock (pp. 313-29).)
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4 The Necessitism-Contingentism Distinction
Williamson’s now well-known alternative to the P-A distinction is his distinction
between necessitism and contingentism (2013, 2):
[N]ecessitism says that necessarily everything is necessarily something;
still more long-windedly: it is necessary that everything is such that
it is necessary that something is identical with it. In a slogan: ontol-
ogy is necessary. Contingentism denies that necessarily everything is
necessarily something. In a slogan: ontology is contingent.
More formally, then, we have:
Nec ∀x∃y y = x
Cont ^∃x^∀y y , x
An apparent virtue of Williamson’s distinction is that it does not require a new
predicate. But note that it is indeed a different distinction that is entirely or-
thoganal to the P-A distinction. Possibilists are indeed typically necessitists — all
objects, whether actual or merely possible, are necessarily something. But there
is nothing to prevent a possibilist from being a contingentist, i.e., from holding
that some possibilia might not have been anything, ∃x(¬E!x ∧^E!x ∧^∀y y , x).
Likewise — and, as we’ll see in §5, very significantly — there is nothing to prevent
an actualist from being a necessitist and holding that there couldn’t have been
anything that doesn’t already exist. As we’ll see now, however, in order to ac-
commodate powerful contingentist intuitions, Williamson must appeal to notions
that enable us to reconstruct the modern P-A distinction in terms of his preferred
framework.
4.1 Concreteness and the Contingentist Challenge
There are two simple arguments for contingentism based, respectively, upon two
compelling modal propositions. First, intuitively,
Cont- Some things might not have existed, i.e., might not have been identical
with anything, ∃x^¬∃y y = x.
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For example, the Pope (as of July 2018), Jorge Bergoglio, might have failed to exist.
Hence, it could have been that nothing was identical to him, ^¬∃y y = j. Gener-
alizing, we have ∃x^¬∃y y = x, and so by the modal principle T we have exactly
Cont.
Second, intuitively,
Cont+ There might have been things other than those that actually exist, i.e.,
things that would not have been identical with any actually existing thing,
^∃x@¬∃y y = x.
For example, assuming his lifelong chastity, Bergoglio is in fact childless but cer-
tainly might not have been, ^∃xCxj; he could have, say, foregone the priesthood
and raised a family in Argentina instead. Given widely accepted views on the es-
sentiality of origins, nothing that actually exists could have been Bergoglio’s child,
i.e., ∀x(Cxj→@¬∃y y = x). Hence, by some simple modal reasoning, there could
have been something — a child of Bergoglio — that would have been distinct from
everything that actually exists, ^∃x@¬∃y y = x, and, hence, more generally, that
could have been distinct from everything that might have existed, which is exactly
Cont.23
Subsistence possibilists, of course, will agree with the basic intuition underly-
ing Cont- but express it in terms of the existence/actuality predicate E!:
E!- Some existing things might not have existed, ∃x(E!x∧^¬E!x).
What they will dispute is the contingentist’s (for them) illicit identification ∃E! of
being with existence that enables the inference from E!- to Cont-; substituting ∃y y =
x for E!x in the former yields the latter immediately. For, while necessitism is true
for the (subsistence) possibilist — everything there is is necessarily something —
not everything necessarily exists. Had Bergoglio’s parents never met, for example,
he would not have existed, but there still would have been such a thing as Bergoglio
— though, of course, qua subsistent being, he would not have been human (or a
he, for that matter), or conscious, or spatio-temporal, or named ‘Bergoglio’, etc.
Likewise, while Bergoglio in fact has no children, there are (given the essential-
ity of origin) non-existent things that are not actually his children but could have
23Thought of semantically, this last step here requires that accessibility be symmetric (as it is in
Williamson’s S5-based logic).
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been. Hence, the possibilist will agree with the basic intuition underlying Cont+,
so long as it is again expressed in terms of the existence predicate E!:
^E!+ There might have existed things other than those that actually exist,
^∃x(E!x∧@¬E!x).
However, for the possibilist, ^E!+ is not basic but, rather, a direct consequence of
the more substantive (possibilist) truth that
E!+ There are things that don’t exist but which could have existed,
∃x(¬E!x∧^E!x).
Bergoglio’s merely possible children, for example, do not in fact exist but could
have. What the possibilist will resist, once again, is ∃E!, the identification of being
with existence that enables the inference from^E!+ to Cont+; as above, substituting
∃y y = x for E!x in the former yields the latter immediately.
Drawing upon a move first made by Linsky and Zalta (1994; 1996) in their well-
known defense of necessitism, Williamson’s response parallels the possibilist’s.
Like the actualist, Williamson purports to reject the bifurcation of being; to be is
to exist. What he claims, however, is that the contingentist confuses existence —
at least, with regard to ordinary individuals like us — with concreteness. Neces-
sitism is true; everything — hence, trivially, for Williamson, everything that exists
— is necessarily something. However, not everything is necessarily concrete. Had
Bergoglio’s parents never met, for example, he would not have been concrete, but
there still would have been such a thing as Bergoglio — though, of course, qua
non-concrete being, he would not have been human (or a he, for that matter), or
conscious, or spatio-temporal, or named ‘Bergoglio’, etc. Thus, more generally, ac-
cording to Williamson, the intuition underpinning Cont− is, not that some things
might not have existed, but that (introducing a predicate C! for concreteness):
C!- Some concrete things might not have been concrete, ∃x(C!x∧^¬C!x).
Likewise, while Bergoglio in fact has no children, there are (given the essentiality
of origin) non-concrete things that are not actually his children but could have
been. Thus, Williamson will agree with the basic intuition underlying Cont+, so
long as it is again expressed in terms of the concreteness predicate C!:
^C!+ There might have been concrete things other than those that are actually
concrete, ^∃x(C!x∧@¬C!x).
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And, again paralleling possibilism, this intuition is a direct consequence of the
more substantive (Williamsonian) truth that
C!+ There are non-concrete things that could have been concrete,
∃x(¬C!x∧^C!x).
However, C!- and C!+ are not really sufficiently general to serve as the meta-
physical principles underlying Williamson’s response to the contingentist chal-
lenge, as such principles should (as far as possible) be necessarily true and in-
dependent of what is actually the case. Arguably, C!- and C!+ are neither. C!-
is true in virtue of the (arguably) contingent fact that there are concrete things
and, likewise, C!+ in virtue of the (arguably) contingent Williamsonian fact that
there are contingently non-concrete things. By generalizing C!- and C!+ so they
are independent of what is actually the case, we have the metaphysical principles
underlying Williamson’s response to the contingentist challenge, which we might
call contingent non-concretism:
CnC− ^∃x(C!x∧^¬C!x)
CnC+ ^∃x(¬C!x∧^C!x).
Given Williamson’s S5-based framework, both principles are necessary and, more-
over, easily shown to be logically equivalent.24 Hence, we will identify Williamson’s
contingent non-concretism simply with the principle CnC+, i.e., with the the prin-
ciple that, possibly, there are things that are not concrete, but could have been —
henceforth, simply “CnC”.
4.2 Return of the P-A Distinction
The observant, or even not-so-observant, reader cannot help but notice the struc-
tural similarity between the basic subsistence conception Poss of possibilism and
Williamson’s contingent non-concretism, CnC — CnC simply replaces the exis-
tence predicate E! with a concreteness predicate C!. Likewise, one cannot fail to
24Suppose CnC+ is true, i.e., true in the actual world @. Then there is a world w1 (accessible
from @) where C!+ is true, i.e., where an individual a is non-concrete and possibly concrete. Let
w2 be a world accessible from w1 where a is concrete. Then, since accessibility is symmetric, w1 is
accessible fromw2 and so it’s true inw2 that there is something (viz., a) that is concrete but possibly
non-concrete, i.e., C!- true w2. Since accessibility is transitive, w2 is accessible from @, so CnC− is
true. Exactly parallel reasoning demonstrates the converse.
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notice the structural similarity between the ontologies of possibilism and contin-
gent non-concretism. The reason for this structural similarity should be clear:
contingently non-concrete objects like Bergoglio’s possible children — contingent
non-concreta, for short(ish) — are nothing other than the mere possibilia of the sub-
sistence conception.25 For there is not one (non-question-begging26) property of
possibilia not shared by contingent non-concreta and vice versa. Williamson’s con-
tingent non-concretism, then, is essentially just a repackaging of the subsistence
conception of possibilism in terms of concreteness rather than existence.
However, in light of the discussion of abstracta in §2, we need to spell this
claim out rather carefully. Recall that the basic issue in §2 was whether to con-
sider abstracta to be subsisting or existing things, and we found strong reasons for
actualists and possibilists alike on the subsistence conception to opt for the latter
and, hence, to adopt the modern conception of the P-A distinction, as depicted in
Figure 2. Under that conception, the concreteness predicate C! is obviously not
synonymous with the actuality/existence predicate E! since, pretty much by defi-
nition, no abstract entity could be concrete, Given that assumption, the existence
predicate, as it occurs in the modern P-A distinction, can still be defined in terms
of the concreteness predicate as follows:27
DfE! E!x =df C!x∨¬C!x.
And under this definition, the principles Act, Poss, and ^E! of the modern sub-
sistence conception emerge directly out of Williamson’s framework: unpacking
E!x according to DfE!, the formal expression Poss of the subsistence conception of
possibilism — ^∃x(¬E!x∧^E!x) — becomes
PossC! ^∃x[¬(C!x∨¬C!x)∧^(C!x∨¬C!x)].
But PossC! is easily shown to be logically equivalent to CnC, ^∃x(¬C!x∧^C!x).
Recall also that the subsistence actualist carves out their position in contrast
to possibilism — it is to deny that there are possibilia. But, as I’ve argued, the
25This claim might require minor modification if there are contingent abstracta of the sort men-
tioned in note 17. Terminological note: “non-concreta” is admittedly barbarous but a suitable
Latin-ish correlate to “possibilia” seems desirable. My thanks to Alex Dressler for his counsel re-
garding the Latin plural. He will appreciate my noting that he is not responsible for my choice of
the term.
26E.g., possibilia have the property nonexistence while contingent non-concreta do not.
27Williamson himself introduces the notion of chunkiness (p. 313), which corresponds pretty
much exactly to the definition of ‘E!’ here.
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possibilia of the subsistence conception are exactly Williamson’s contingent non-
concreta and, I claim, it is the purported existence of exactly such things that the
typical contingentist objects to. That is, while contingentism is not defined as the
denial of CnC, the typical contingentist will certainly consider its denial to be
definitive of their view; that is, they will take as definitive the thesis that there
could be no contingent non-concreta, i.e., that, necessarily, anything that could be
concrete already is:
SC ∀x(^C!x→ C!x).
But (under S5) SC is exactly equivalent to
ActC! ∀x(^(C!x∨¬C!x)→ (C!x∨¬C!x))
i.e., to the result of unpacking E!x according to DfE! in the formal expression Act
— ∀x(^E!x→ E!x) — of the basic subsistence conception of actualism.
Finally, under DfE!, the principle ^E! that yields the modern P-A distinction
from the basic distinction becomes
^E!C! ∀x^(C!x∨¬C!x)
which is easily seen to be a logical truth of Williamson’s quantified modal logic.
Given ^E!C!, it follows immediately from ActC! — hence SC — that
Act∗C! ∀x(C!x∨¬C!x)
which, under DfE!, is exactly the formulation of modern actualism Act∗, ∀xE!x.
Under DfE!, then, the expressions of both Williamson’s contingent non-concret-
ism CnC and its denial, strict concretism SC, are exactly the result of replacing
the actuality predicate E! in their basic P-A counterparts Poss and Act with the
concreteness predicate C!. Since, once again, the possibilia of the subsistence con-
ception are exactly Williamson’s contingent non-concreta, it follows (together with
Act∗C!) that the modern P-A distinction simply reappears within Williamson’s pre-
ferred framework, albeit repackaged as the CnC-SC distinction. Hence, by re-
labeling appropriately, our depiction of the modern P-A distinction in Figure 2
transforms directly into a depiction of the CnC-SC distinction in Figure 3, and
vice versa.28
28For reasons discussed in note 17, the relabeling may not yield identical ontological categories.
Notably, if there are “mixed” abstracta like {∅,Obama}, they belong in the upper left quadrant of,
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Figure 3: The Modern P-A Distinction under its Williamsonian Repackaging
So whatever confusions or unclarities infect the P-A distinction will reside in
equal measure in Williamson’s own framework in the guise of the CnC-SC distinc-
tion. Of course, I’ve argued at lengthy that the P-A distinction is entirely coherent
and I would allow the same for the CnC-SC distinction — because they are at root
tracking exactly the same broad ontological divide: the possibility or impossibility
of the contingently non-actual/non-concrete.
5 A New Definition of the P-A Distinction
In fact, Williamson’s necessitism does raise a significant problem for friends of the
P-A distinction. The problem, first identified by Linsky and Zalta (1994, pp. 445ff)
is not that it’s confused; rather, its characterization in terms of the existence/actual-
ity predicate E! is, in a sense, too weak.
To elaborate. Intuitively, contingent non-concreta certainly seem to be in an
extraordinarily thin ontological state. As noted above, they are basically points
in logical space that are indistinguishable with regard to their (mostly negative)
non-modal qualitative properties. Moreover, unlike traditional abstract entities
like sets, numbers, and propositions, they bear no structural or constitutive rela-
at least, the circle representing modern actualism in Figure 2. But since, necessarily, it is not the
case that such abstracta are concrete, they belong in the lower left quadrant of the circles in Figure
3.
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tions to one another. These observations lie at the heart of the actualist’s charge
that contingent non-concreta exhibit exactly the quality of being — i.e., subsis-
tence — characteristic of classic possibilia. But necessitists can simply deny it!
Instead, they can reject the definition DfE! of the existence predicate E! that con-
signs contingent non-concreta to the subsistent as question-begging, and blithely
declare themselves to be actualists. As such, they will insist that being and ex-
istence/actuality are one and the same and, hence, that E! simply expresses the
full range of the existential quantifier, as formalized in the definition ∃E!. There
are no possibilia, they can affirm; being is unbifurcated; necessarily, whatever is,
is actual, contingent non-concreta included, their lack of “thick” qualitative prop-
erties notwithstanding. The actualist’s table-banging, foot-stamping protestations
that contingent non-concreta are the very model of subsistent, mere possibilia are
impassively dismissed.29
The problem is galling for the modern actualist: if Williamson and his ilk can-
not be forced into the possibilist box where (the actualist believes) they belong,
then that does indeed appear to reveal a serious shortcoming in the modern P-A
distinction. For, clear and intuitive though the idea of bifurcated being may be as
a way of expressing the P-A distinction, it is not itself sufficiently robust to fore-
stall the necessitist’s gambit; if the necessitist rejects the bifurcation of being and
insists their contingent non-concreta exist as robustly as we, nothing can be done
to demonstrate that they are wrong. One has to accept the idea of bifurcation at
the outset as the proper characterization of contingent non-concreta in order for
the modern P-A distinction, as represented by Poss and Act, to have any punch.
However, I believe there is another way to mark the distinction that doesn’t rely
on bifurcation.
Specifically, I believe we can also locate the source of the disagreement between
actualists and possibilists in a substantive difference regarding the exemplification
of essential properties. Most everyone with reasonably robust modal intuitions —
actualist, possibilist, and necessitist alike — agrees that there are such properties.
Exactly how the notion of an essential property is defined (if it’s definable at all) is
not critical to my proposal. But an important element of the notion is captured in
29Linsky and Zalta (ibid.) themselves only spell out this necessitist gambit without explicitly
committing to it. See also Cameron 2016.
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the familiar traditional modal account30 on which an object a is essentially F (and
that F is essential to a) if and only if, necessarily, a exists only if it is F, (E!a→ Fa),
and a is accidentally F if it is F but not essentially F. As a definition, this account
of essentiality has, with good reason,31 fallen out of favor. But as a necessary
condition it captures an important insight — call it the essentialist intuition —
for both modern actualists and modern possibilists: we look to the properties an
individual has while existing to identify its essential properties — it is in existence,
actuality, that a thing’s essence is made manifest; the properties it may have while
nonexistent (if any) are irrelevant to its nature.
Of course, necessitists who would claim the actualist label (would-be actualists,
for short) will not express the essentialist intuition as above since, for them, E! sig-
nifies a metaphysically trivial property: everything necessarily exists and, hence,
(E!a → Fa) is simply equivalent to Fa, and that clearly cannot be the general
logical form of essentiality for things that are or could be concrete: a tiger, for ex-
ample, though essentially a tiger, is not necessarily a tiger, since it would fail to be
one if it were non-concrete. However, as Zalta (2006, §3) points out, the would-be
actualist can preserve the essentialist intuition for tigers and the like simply by re-
placing existence with concreteness: a property F is essential to (possibly concrete)
object a only if, necessarily, if a is concrete, it has F, (C!a→ Fa).
The acceptance of essential properties enables us to construct an alternative
definition of the P-A distinction upon some common ground. Note, first, that con-
tingentists and necessitists alike all do agree that there can be merely possible Fs,
for many properties F:32
MPF x is a merely possible F iff x is not an F but could have been.
For example, I am a merely possible plumber; Barack Obama is a merely possible
Kenyan; and so on. And here, I think, is where we can drive a permanent wedge
between actualism and Williamsonian necessitism. For, assuming Zalta’s neces-
sitist revision of the essentialist intuition, necessitists of Williamson’s ilk, no less
than subsistence possibilists, believe that, for many properties F, there are merely
possible Fs — hence things that contingently fail to be F — that are nonetheless
30Cf., e.g., Plantinga 1974, pp. 55-6.
31See, e.g., Fine 1994 and Zalta 2006 for criticisms of the definition and Robertson and Atkins
2018 for an overview of various alternatives.
32See in particular Williamson 2013, pp. 11ff.
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essentially F; otherwise put, that there are things that fail to exemplify some of
their essential properties. Thus, for subsistence possibilists and Williamsonian
necessitists alike, merely possible tigers are essentially tigers; Bergoglio’s merely
possible children are essentially human. Though essentially tigers and essentially
human, respectively, they subsist/exist in fact, not as tigers or humans but, as noted
above, beyond space and time, qualitatively indistinguishable from all other pos-
sibilia/contingent non-concreta, failing, in particular, to exemplify at least some, if
not all, of their essential properties.
This failure, I claim, is a central distinguishing feature of possibilia on the sub-
sistence conception. Accordingly, for those who question the bifurcation of being,
we can alternatively characterize the P-A distinction in terms of the acceptance
or rejection of things that fail to examplify all of their essential properties. More
specifically:
POSS Possibly, for some property F, there are merely possible Fs that are essen-
tially F.
ACT Necessarily, for every property F, if something is essentially F, it is F.
Call this the essentialist conception of the P-A distinction. Instead of invoking the
subsistence/existence distinction, the POSS-ACT distinction gets at the root of the
intuition that has grounded the disagreement between actualists and possibilists
in terms of concepts that are clear and (for the relevant stakeholders, anyway)
uncontroversial.33 And it does so in a way that, in accordance with our analysis
above, rightly categorizes Williamsonian necessitism as a species of possibilism.
How might the would-be actualist respond? Recall that Zalta suggested that
the necessitist can preserve the essentialist intuition by taking F to be essential
33In particular, like the original distinction, it makes no reference to possible worlds. Williamson
claims (2013, p. 333) that “[m]uch of the debate between actualists and possibilists revolve[s]
around the legitimacy or illegitimacy of quantification over possible worlds”, such quantification
being “seen as far more problematic for actualists than for possibilists.” But, very little if any-
thing in the debate has revolved around the legitimacy of such quantification; as should be clear
from the principles Poss/Act and POSS/ACT, the question of possibilia on the subsistence con-
ception is entirely orthogonal to it. There are, in particular, actualists who embrace worlds (e.g.,
Plantinga (1974) and R. Adams (1981)) and those that do not (e.g., Menzel (1990)). Moreover, while
the project of defining worlds as abstract objects of some ilk is usually associated with actualism
(though see Zalta 1993), the problems involved in the project are largely independent of one’s com-
mitment to possibilia (see, e.g., Grim 1984 and 1986; Menzel 1986, 1989, and 2012). It’s also worth
noting that similar problems arise for the worlds of Lewisian reductionism (see, e.g., Forrest and
Armstrong 1984 and Lewis 1986).
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to a only if necessarily, a has F if concrete, (C!a→ Fa). Williamson (2013, p. 8)
himself suggests instead that the necessitist identify the form of essential prop-
erties (for possibly concrete beings) with that of the reified condition here. For
any property F, let FC! be the property being F if concrete, [λxC!x→ Fx]; then, as
per Williamson’s suggestion, for any property F, FC! is essential to a only if, nec-
essarily, a has FC!, i.e., only if [λxC!x → Fx]a. Thus, a tiger is not essentially
a tiger but, rather, essentially a tiger if concrete, and Bergoglio’s possible children
are not essentially human but essentially human if concrete. On this understand-
ing of essentiality, the would-be actualist is indeed an actualist on the POSS-ACT
distinction: because, for example, both actual and merely possible tigers are nec-
essarily tigers if concrete, TC!, if something is essentially TC!, it is TC!, in accordance
with ACT.
But the proposal is a bit odd, for a couple reasons. First, building the con-
creteness condition into essential properties themselves makes it the case that, for
natural kinds K , the distinguishing essential property of Ks, viz., KC!, is shared by
every non-concrete (hence non-K) object. Thus, in particular, the number 7, God,
and Bergoglio’s merely possible children are all alike tigers if concrete. At the least,
this feature of Williamsonian essentiality seems at odds with modern conceptions
of essence. Second, the move seems entirely unnecessary. For it is logically true
for the necessitist that, for any property F and individual a, necessarily, a is F if
concrete if and only if a is F if concrete, ([λxC!x → Fx]a ↔ (C!a → Fa)). Why
not, then, follow Zalta and preserve the essentialist intuition by taking being F if
concrete simply to be a necessary condition for F’s being essential to a rather than
identifying it as the logical form of a’s essential properties? After all, the logical
form of Williamson’s account, no less than Zalta’s, in accord with the essentialist
intuition, reveals that certain properties a thing a must have while concrete mark
its essence, even if we don’t define them as a’s essential properties.
However, should would-be actualists nonetheless dig in their heels and insist
that Williamson’s suggestion is the correct account of essentiality, we can modify
POSS and ACT accordingly:
POSS* Possibly, for some property F, there are merely possible Fs that are essen-
tially FC!.
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ACT* Necessarily, for every property F, if something is essentially FC!, it is F.34
On these modified definitions, the would-be actualists are back in the possibilist
box — all and only possibilists think there could be things that are essentially FC!
but not F, notably, merely possible tigers and merely possible people. Actualists,
by contrast, deny there are any such things.35
Only two options appear to remain for the would-be actualist: abandon CnC
or abandon essentialism. The former is surely untenable as, not only is CnC the
means by which the necessitist turns back the contingentist challenge discussed
in §4.1, the denial of CnC is obviously false in the context of necessitism + essen-
tialism — it entails, for example, that every actually existing human being exists
necessarily (hence, in particular, eternally) as a human being. So in fact the only
coherent option that could render Williamsonian necessitism consistent with actu-
alism is the denial of essentialism (thereby rendering ACT* trivial). It is true that
necessitism per se and essentialism are orthogonal. One can certainly hold that ev-
erything exists necessarily but that nothing, or at least no possibly concrete thing,
has an essence; one can, without contradiction, be a necessitist and believe as well
that a merely possible human, for example, could also be a mosquito, or that an
actual block of wood might have been a bar of gold. But to adopt such a stance
is to abandon one of the liveliest and most fundamental of the modal intuitions
that would typically drive necessitism in the first place — certainly a necessitism
34If one wishes to insist that numbers and other abstracta are (contrary to most any modern
conception of essence) essentially F if concrete, ACT* could be restricted to things that are possibly
F.
35It’s important not to get the scoping wrong here. Formally, where Σ(G,x) means that G is es-
sential to x, ACT* says that ∀F∀x(Σ(FC!,x) → Fx). Thus, the actualist can accept that Toni is
essentially, hence necessarily, a tiger if concrete, TC!, but Toni won’t be in the range of the quantifier
at worlds where she doesn’t exist and, hence, though not a tiger at those worlds, she won’t be a
value of the variable x for which Σ(FC!,x) is true at those worlds and, hence, won’t serve as a coun-
terexample to ACT*.
An objection to these modifications of POSS and ACT might be heard from so-called serious actu-
alists, who hold that property exemplification entails existence (Prior 1957 (p. 31), Plantinga 1983
and 1985, Hudson 1997, Caplan 2007, Stephanou 2007). For, on the account of essential properties
that the actualist is conceding to Williamson here, contingent beings have their essential properties
necessarily. But if exemplification entails existence — i.e., if (Fx→ E!x), for any property F and
entity x — then no contingent being has any essential properties; Toni, in particular, will not be
a tiger if concrete essentially. However, in Menzel 1993 (pp. 136-142) it is argued in detail that a
simple change of semantic perspective allows the actualist to agree that Toni is necessarily a tiger if
concrete, i.e., that [λxC!x→ T x]t, without abandoning the metaphysical intuitions that underlie
serious actualism. See also Fine 1985, §4, esp. pp. 163ff, Pollock 1985, §2, Hinchliff 1989, and
Yagisawa 2005
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as rich and robust as Williamson’s. Given that one of the central talking points of
the Williamsonian necessitist is that the view leaves all of our fundamental modal
intuitions in place, abandoning essentialism is also untenable. So the categoriza-
tion of Williamsonian necessitism as a species of possibilism on the essentialist
conception appears to stand.
Finally, it is worth elaborating briefly on the point noted three paragraphs back
that, on either necessitist account of essentiality, Zalta’s or Williamson’s, it is the
properties a thing must have while concrete that mark its essence, even if they are
not defined as essential as per Williamson. But in acknowledging this, the would-
be actualist seems to give the game away. For both accounts acknowledge that
concreteness is not simply one accidental property among others but, rather, a
state that reveals a thing’s essence, a state in which the nature of a possibly con-
crete thing is manifest in the “thick” properties it exhibits when actually in that
state. Whether or not one wishes to categorize that state in terms of robustness of
being, it is difficult to deny that a powerful redolence of the bifurcation of being
remains even on the essentialist conception of the P-A distinction. This recognition
undercuts the would-be actualist’s rejection of the definition DfE! of the actuality
predicate E!: in an ontology that includes contingent non-concreta, being concrete
(or necessarily non-concrete) is a distinguished way to be that tracks the notion of
existence/actuality in the modern subsistence conception of the P-A distinction.
And that, in turn, further validates the legitimacy of our original account of the
distinction in terms of Poss and Act — whether or not we take E! to be primitive
or defined in terms of the concreteness predicate C!.
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